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Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not 
Responsibility but Treatment 
Henry T. Greely* 
Frontal leucotomy, despite certain limitations of the operative method, 
must be considered one of the most important discoveries ever made in 
psychiatric therapy, because through its use a great number of suffering 
people and total invalids have recovered and have been socially 
rehabilitated. 
The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1949 Presentation Speech1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1949 Egas Moniz won the Nobel Prize for inventing the procedure 
commonly known as the prefrontal lobotomy.  Within twenty-five years, 
the procedure was both generally abandoned and widely reviled. 
Today we are regularly making new discoveries about the 
functioning of the human brain, discoveries that have led many lawyers, 
philosophers, and neuroscientists to speculate about the consequences of 
our new understanding for the criminal justice system.2  Their attention 
has focused almost exclusively on questions of responsibility and their 
conclusions have ranged from apocalyptic3 to “business as usual.”4  I, 
too, believe that advances in neuroscience will change, dramatically, the 
criminal justice system, but I expect issues of responsibility to play a  
 
                                                          
*  Deane F. and Kate Edelman Johnson Professor of Law, Professor (by courtesy) of Genetics, 
Stanford University.  The author would like to thank two research assistants for their able help with 
this paper: Sean Johnson and Kelly Lowenberg. 
 1. H. Olivecrona, Presentation Speech, Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1949, available 
at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1949/press.html. 
 2. E.g., Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohan, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and 
Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACT. ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1775 (2004); Dean Mobbs et al., Law, 
Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PLOS BIOL 693–99 (2007); Stephen J. Morse, Brain Overclaim Syn-
drome and Criminal Responsibility: A Diagnostic Note, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2006); Robert 
M. Sapolsky, The Frontal Cortex and the Criminal Justice System, 359 PHIL. TRANSACT. ROYAL 
SOC’Y LONDON B 1787 (2004). 
 3. Sapolsky, supra note 2. 
 4. Morse, supra note 2. 
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small role in those changes—and an overly strong focus on responsibility 
to draw attention away from more important and troubling areas. 
Neuroscientific evidence about the links between brain dysfunction 
and criminal behavior seems, to me, unlikely to change our lay views of 
the demands of justice or to touch the non-retributive justifications for 
invoking a criminal justice system: deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation.  Instead, we may see major changes in how crimes are 
investigated, in how trials are conducted, in how sentencing decisions are 
reached, and in what kinds of sentences are imposed.  Lie detection and 
other forms of “mind-reading” may be used to investigate crimes.5  Trials 
may be affected both by the introduction of such mind-reading evidence 
and by neuroscientific evidence of bias, on the part of parties, witnesses, 
jurors, and even judges.6  Issues of psychopathy, frontal lobe damage, 
and other asserted “causes” of criminal behavior may be used, not to 
reduce responsibility, but as predictive factors to increase sentences.7  
And neuroscience, defined broadly, may provide us with new options in 
sentencing that hold out the promise of effective rehabilitation through 
treatment.8 
This essay examines only the last of those issues—the possible 
consequences of neuroscience for the kinds of sentences that may be 
imposed on convicted criminals.  I argue that neuroscience is likely to 
produce a number of different types of interventions—surgical, 
pharmacological, and other—that will be said to prevent, or to lessen the 
risk of, continuing criminal conduct.  These interventions will be 
tempting for both their promise of rehabilitation—making the criminal a 
good and useful member of society—and their promise of  
 
                                                          
 5. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property: Some Possible 
Legal and Social Implications of Advances in Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW 114, 
128–32 (Brent Garland, ed., 2004) [hereinafter Greely, Litigation]; Henry T. Greely, Neuroethics 
and ELSI: Similarites and Differences, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 599, 614, 632 (2006); Henry T. 
Greely & Judy Illes, NEUROSCIENCE-BASED LIE DETECTION: THE URGENT NEED FOR REGULATION, 33 
AM. J.L. & MED., 377 (2007); Paul Root Wolpe, et al., Emerging Nerotechnologies for Lie-
Detection: Promises and Perils, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar.−Apr. 2005, at 39. 
 6. Greely, Litigation, supra note 5, at 128–37 (discussing mind-reading evidence); id. at 137–
38 (discussing evidence of bias). 
 7. I recently organized a seminar for federal judges on legal issues in genetics and neurosci-
ence.  It was striking how uninterested judges were in violence-inducing brain conditions for issues 
of responsibility, sanity, and so on, and how very interested they were in those same questions in 
terms of sentencing decisions.  Ironically, what might be set out as a mitigating factor for a defen-
dant in terms of responsibility is likely to increase the sentence for a convicted criminal. 
 8. The connection between neuroscientific treatments and rehabilitation is not essential.  One 
could imagine that someone who viewed retribution as the (or at least a) main purpose of criminal 
sentencing being interested in using neuroscience to make a sentence more painful and punitive.  
This essay will not walk those dark paths—but they probably exist. 
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incapacitation—preventing him, in a way more powerful than any prison 
walls, from committing more crimes.9 
I am not a scholar of the criminal justice system and I will not delve 
into the long and deep discussions of the different justifications for that 
system.  Instead, I will use what I know about neuroscience to lay out the 
plausible kinds of brain-based interventions that may be suggested (or 
are already being used) to prevent criminal behavior.10  I will then lay out 
the problems involved in trying to determine whether such interventions 
are safe and effective.  These problems will be enormous and probably 
under-appreciated.  My main argument is that we need to be vigilant to 
avoid the over-enthusiastic adoption of unproven new “treatments”—
practiced in the brains of, at best, unsympathetic and, at worst, despised 
people.—I will end with a brief discussion of some of the normative 
issues that would have to be addressed if we found safe and effective 
interventions.  But those issues lie, largely though not entirely, beyond 
the horizon.  For now, we need to worry about safety and effectiveness 
and to learn from past failures, like the prefrontal lobotomy, if we are to 
have any chance to avoid misuse of new techniques. 
I. NEUROSCIENCE AND THE “TREATMENT” OF CRIMINALS 
Our increasing understanding of the brain is producing new ways to 
intervene in human behavior—to change minds by directly changing 
                                                          
 9. John Stinneford, in a recent article on chemical castration, quoted a lovely way of express-
ing the comparative strength of prisons versus brains: 
In 1642, during his imprisonment for presenting a royalist petition to the rebellious House 
of Commons, the cavalier poet Richard Lovelace wrote the following, now-famous lines: 
Stone walls do not a prison make, 
Nor iron bars a cage; 
Minds innocent and quiet take 
That for an hermitage; 
If I have freedom in my love 
And in my soul am free, 
Angels alone, that soar above, 
Enjoy such liberty. 
John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the Eighth Amendment, 
and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 560 (2006) (quoting Richard Lovelace, 
To Althea: From Prison, in The Oxford Book of English Verse 1250–1900 374 (Arthur Quiller-
Couch, ed., Oxford U. Press 1919)). 
 10. There is a long history of discussion of, and concern about, various methods of “mind con-
trol” being used in the criminal justice system, including such psychological methods as aversive 
therapy.  (Aversive therapy was the method used in the famous novel (and movie), A Clockwork Or-
ange. ANTHONY BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1962).)  I will not discuss that history in this 
essay. 
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brains.  We can directly change brains in at least four different ways: 
neurosurgery, deep brain stimulation, drugs, and vaccines. At least some 
uses of those methods may be able to reduce some kinds of criminal 
behavior.  The following discussion is necessarily quite speculative.  The 
best-understood examples are pharmacological interventions for sex 
offenders or drug addicts.  Other forms of brain interventions to combat 
criminal behavior are, at this point, guesses, though guesses with some 
basis in science. 
A. Pharmacological Treatments 
The criminal justice system has used pharmacological treatments to 
try to control crime in at least two major respects: chemical castration for 
sex offenders and pharmacological interventions for drug or alcohol 
addicts.  In addition, mentally ill people in the criminal justice system 
(and outside it) have sometimes been compelled to take drugs to treat 
their mental illness.  Other pharmacological interventions against crime 
seem plausible but do not appear to have been widely discussed. 
1. Chemical Castration 
The best example of pharmacological treatment for criminal 
behavior is “chemical castration for sex offenders.”11  Starting in the 
mid-1990s, several American states authorized the use of so-called 
chemical castration on various sex offenders,12 following the lead of 
                                                          
 11. Writing on castration provides an interesting insight into published legal scholarship.  A 
quick search of the Lexis database for articles with the U.S. and Canadian Law Reviews database 
turned up thirty-one law review articles on the subject.  One used the term metaphorically; the other 
thirty were about castration of sex offenders.  One of the thirty articles was published in 1994; 
twenty-four of the thirty were published in either 1997 or 1998.  Since then, one was published in 
years 1999, 2001, 2005, 2006, and 2007.  Twenty-two of the thirty publications were law student 
work.  (Subsequent searches turned up at least two more articles, one published in 1993 and one in 
1998.)  Apparently when a “sexy” topic emerges, it will lead to an outpouring of student works with 
very little follow-up. 
 12. As noted above, more than thirty law review articles discuss these castration statutes.  This 
discussion relies primarily on J. Michael Bailey & Aaron S. Greenberg, Lessons from the Morse 
Case, 92 NW. U.L. REV. 1225 (1998); Lystra Batchoo, Voluntary Surgical Castration of Sex Offend-
ers: Waiving the Eighth Amendment Protection from Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 72 BROOK. L. 
REV. 689 (2007); Stinneford, supra note 9; William Winslade et al., Castrating Pedophiles Con-
victed of Sex Offenses Against Children: New Treatment or Old Punishment?, 51 SMU L. REV. 349 
(1998); Caroline M. Wong, Chemical Castration: Oregon’s Innovative Approach to Sex Offender 
Rehabilitation, or Unconstitutional Punishment?, 80 OR. L. REV. 267 (2001); Recent Legislation, 
Constitutional Law—Due Process and Equal Protection— California Becomes First State to Re-
quire Chemical Castration of Certain Sex Offenders, 110 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1997). 
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some northern European nations.13  Chemical castration refers to a 
regular series of injections of a drug known as medroxyprogesterone 
acetate (“MPA”) and sold under the trade name of Depo-Provera.14  
Depo-Provera has long been an approved method of birth control for 
women.  When given to a man, it greatly lowers the man’s testosterone 
level.  The results include difficulty in (but not always impossibility of) 
having erections or ejaculations, as well as (and apparently more 
importantly for crime control) a sharp decline in sexual thoughts and 
impulses.15 
Currently seven states have statutes expressly authorizing chemical 
castration of at least some male sex offenders.  California, Florida, 
Louisiana, Montana, and Iowa—states with nothing obvious in common 
beyond names that end in “a”—require chemical castration for certain 
classes of sex offenders.16  The relevant offenses are defined broadly in 
some states and narrowly in others; some states only require treatment 
for second offenders, while others allow it on the first conviction.  
Oregon has a pilot program with only a small number of carefully 
selected offenders forced to undergo the treatment.17  All of these states 
require the treatments to start shortly before release from prison and to 
continue either until the state no longer deems it necessary (California, 
Florida, Montana, and Iowa), or until the end of parole or post-prison 
supervision (Louisiana and Oregon).18  Wisconsin’s statute is more 
discretionary, authorizing, but not requiring, the state Department of 
Corrections or Parole Commission to make chemical castration a 
condition of probation or parole in individual cases.19 
An eighth state, Texas, does not authorize chemical castration, but 
expressly provides that certain convicts may voluntarily choose surgical 
castration.20  Four of the seven chemical castration states allow voluntary 
surgical castration as an alternative.  Unlike chemical castration, where 
the effects wear off quickly without regular administration of the drug, 
surgical castration is permanent (although some of the effects can be 
reversed by male hormone injections). 
                                                          
 13. Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland all authorize either surgical 
or chemical castration for some sex offenses.  See Wong, supra note 12, at 270. 
 14. Other drugs have been considered for use, or have been used in other countries, for chemi-
cal castration, but MPA is the drug used in the United States. 
 15. See Stinneford, supra note 9, at 573. 
 16. See id. at 578–82. 
 17. Id. at 580. 
 18. Id. at 578. 
 19. Id. at 581. 
 20. Id. 
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2. Anti-Addiction Programs 
Some addiction treatment programs provide a second example of 
pharmacological interventions against crime.  These programs use FDA-
approved drugs to combat drug or alcohol addiction, sometimes by 
themselves but usually in conjunction with other anti-addiction 
counseling and treatments.  Participation in such programs may be 
required as a condition of probation or parole or, more commonly, may 
be ordered by “drug courts.”  Each of these pharmacological treatments 
for addiction is somewhat effective but none is broadly successful.21 
Addiction to heroin or other opioids (such as morphine, oxycodone, 
hydrocodone, and fentanyl) can be treated with methadone, which 
prevents withdrawal symptoms and reduces the craving for heroin, while 
avoiding many of the risks and harms of heroin.  Methadone, a synthetic 
opioid, works as an “agonist” with respect to heroin—it attaches itself to 
the same receptors on brain neurons as heroin does and causes a response 
in them, but causes no euphoria.  The patient has, in effect, substituted 
methadone addiction for the more damaging heroin addiction.  Patients 
in methadone maintenance programs typically receive their dose by a 
daily pill, usually administered at the treatment center.  Since 2002, 
another opioid, buprenorphine, has also been approved in the United 
States for treatment of opioid addiction.  The use of both methadone and 
buprenorphine to treat drug addiction is heavily regulated by both federal 
and state governments. 
Naltrexone, like methadone, is a synthetic opioid.  Naltrexone blocks 
the opioid receptors without eliciting a response from neurons, 
preventing other opioids from binding to them.  Because Naltrexone 
eliminates or attenuates the opioids’ effects, it can be used to treat opioid 
addiction.  It does not prevent cravings for the opioid and so is mainly 
useful in highly motivated patients.  Naltrexone is usually administered 
by a daily pill, but in 2006 the FDA approved an injectable version 
whose effects last for thirty days.22 
Naltrexone is also one of three drugs used against alcohol addiction, 
although it is not clear how it works.  Alcohol addiction also is 
sometimes treated with disulfiram (sold as Antabuse), a drug that does 
not diminish the craving for alcohol but that makes its consumption 
                                                          
 21. Nicotine addiction also can be treated with some increased success through drug therapy in 
the form of nicotine replacement therapy.  The smoker gets the nicotine to which he or she is ad-
dicted but without the manifold dangers of cigarette smoke.  Nicotine addiction, however, is rarely 
associated directly with criminal behavior. 
 22. FDA Approvals: Vivitrol, Apr. 20, 2006, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/530353. 
GREELY_FINAL 10/18/2008  10:50:54 AM 
2008] NEUROSCIENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1109 
extremely unpleasant, causing vomiting, headaches, and severe flu 
symptoms.  Acamprosate is a third drug for alcoholism that the FDA 
recently approved.  It seems to work more directly on neurotransmitter 
levels and to limit the effects of alcohol withdrawal.23 
3. Mandatory Treatment with Anti-Psychotics 
Although it is not part of the criminal sentencing process, the United 
States does have substantial experience with mandatory treatment of the 
mentally ill—as prisoners, criminal defendants, or inmates in mental 
hospitals—with anti-psychotic drugs.  The Supreme Court has held that 
anti-psychotic drugs can only be administered involuntarily under certain 
conditions.  It allowed the involuntary use of anti-psychotic drugs on 
prisoners when it had been appropriately determined that “the inmate is 
dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate’s 
medical interest.”24  The Court has upheld forced administration of anti-
psychotic drugs when necessary to make a defendant competent to stand 
trial (under some conditions),25 but has overturned convictions where 
criminal defendants were forced to take anti-psychotic medication during 
their trials in the absence of a determination that the use of the drug was 
necessary.26  And, in Singleton v. Norris, the Eighth Circuit, en banc, 
held that a condemned prisoner who was properly subject to mandatory 
anti-psychotic medication, for the protection of himself and others, could 
be forced to continue taking the medication in order to be competent to 
be executed.27 
Of more direct interest are cases where probation or parole was 
conditioned on taking unwanted psychotropic medication.  In at least two 
cases, federal courts have held that parole or supervised release could not 
be conditioned on agreeing to take psychotropic medications unless there 
was a judicial finding that the medication was necessary.28  In a third 
case, the court intimated as much but remanded the case to the district  
 
 
                                                          
 23. Varenicline, an anti-nicotine addiction drug, sold as Chantix, is also reputed to be effective 
in treating alcohol addiction, based, in part, on a study in rats.  The FDA has not approved it for that 
purpose. 
 24. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990). 
 25. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 188 (2003). 
 26. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134–35 (1992). 
 27. Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 832 (2003). 
 28. U.S. v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004) (anti-psychotic drugs); Felce v. Fied-
ler, 974 F.2d 1484, 1495 (7th Cir. 1992) (anti-psychotic drugs). 
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court, which had initially dismissed it as frivolous, for that court’s full 
consideration of the issue.29 
4. Other Treatments 
One could imagine other treatment regimes, such as requiring 
convicts with violent impulses to use tranquilizers or sedatives, but there 
seems to have been little research or activity in this area.  There have 
been at least two litigated allegations that prison or mental hospital 
officials were experimenting with psychoactive drugs on inmates in 
efforts to control their behavior.  Both of these cases seem to have 
involved drugs that caused fear or pain as part of so-called aversive 
therapy, not drugs with a direct effect on criminal behavior.30 
Apart from the ongoing interest in chemical castration, addiction 
treatment, and some uses of anti-psychotic drugs, current interest in 
pharmacological reduction of criminal behavior seems limited.  Some 
evidence exists that antidepressants reduce at least some kinds of 
aggressive behavior.31  There is also discussion in the literature of the 
hoped-for development of drugs to treat various impulse control 
disorders, some of which are related to criminal behavior.32 
This very limited interest may result from the problems of enforcing 
a mandatory drug program on non-institutionalized persons.  Those 
required to take the drugs may skip their dose, take too little, or take too 
much, but this problem does not seem insurmountable.  If the drug were 
taken infrequently enough, it might be practical to require the person to 
come to a monitored location to take the drug, or to receive it by 
injection or intravenous infusion.  Because they would be greater 
invasions of bodily integrity than swallowing a pill, injections or 
infusions might face a higher legal hurdle.  Another option would be to 
require regular screening for the drug; a subject without a sufficient 
blood level of the drug could be deemed in violation of the treatment.  
                                                          
 29. Bundy v. Stommel,168 Fed. App’x. 870, 873 (10th Cir. 2006) (Prozac). 
 30. In one of the cases, Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973), there is no indica-
tion whether the plaintiff’s allegations of unauthorized experimentation were true.  In the second 
case, however, the Iowa Security Medical Facility was found to have injected inmates who had vio-
lated the rules with a drug called apomorphine, which caused fifteen minutes to an hour of vomiting, 
as part of an experimental “aversive therapy.”  Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).  
That court enjoined this “therapy” unless done by medical professionals and with the inmates’ in-
formed consent. 
 31. See Alyson J. Bond, Antidepressant Treatments and Human Aggression, 526 EUR. J. PHAR-
MACOL. 218 (2005). 
 32. Stephen J. Hucker, Impulse Control Disorders, http://www.forensicpsychiatry.ca/impulse 
/overview.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2008). 
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Many probationers or parolees already have to undergo screening for use 
of illegal drugs; adding a test for a therapeutic drug may not be difficult.  
Finally, timed-release versions of the drugs might be created that kept the 
subject from changing the dose.  These could be similar to Norplant, a 
birth control drug inserted under the skin of the arm that remains 
effective, if not removed, for five years.  Ultimately, the lack of 
discussion of pharmacological control of criminal behavior probably 
stems from a shortage of effective drugs.  If increased knowledge of the 
brain were to produce effective drugs, their use would likely be 
considered. 
B. Psychosurgery 
Neurosurgery has been used to control neurological diseases, such as 
some kinds of intractable epilepsy, as well as aberrant behaviors.  In the 
latter context it is called “psychosurgery.”  Perhaps the most famous, or 
infamous, kind of neurosurgery for behavior modification is the frontal 
leucotomy or leukotomy, better known as the prefrontal lobotomy, for 
which Egas Moniz won the Nobel Prize in Medicine in 1949. 
This procedure involves severing the connections between the frontal 
cortex and deeper parts of the brain.33  It was used for several decades to 
treat a wide range of psychiatric conditions, including depression, bipolar 
disease, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia.  It was 
reported to have calmed and made more manageable many of its 
subjects; it also frequently produced profound personality changes, 
particularly severe apathy, and at least in some cases severe cognitive 
deterioration.  The procedure faded from use with the development of the 
first generation of anti-psychotic drugs in the mid-1950s and ultimately 
was discredited, particularly in popular culture.34  Over 30,000 
Americans received lobotomies, although I can find no record that it was 
ever used as part of a criminal sentence.35 
                                                          
 33. See Victor W. Swayze II, Frontal Leukotomy and Related Psychosurgical Procedures in 
the Era Before Antipsychotics (1935–1954): A Historical Overview, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 505 
(1995). 
 34. Ken Kesey’s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest provided probably the most powerfully 
negative fictional depiction of a lobotomy, echoed in the extremely successful movie made from the 
book in 1975.  (The movie, which starred Jack Nicholson as the eventually lobotomized protagonist, 
Randall McMurphy, won all five major Academy Awards—best picture, best actor, best actress, best 
director, and best screenplay.) 
 35. The number of Americans who received prefrontal lobotomies is not entirely clear.  One 
frequently finds references to 40,000 or 50,000 subjects of the surgery.  Swayze cites sources that 
concluded that just over 18,600 prefrontal lobotomies were performed by June 30, 1951.  Swayze, 
supra note 33, at 511.  He then cites another source for the position that probably not more than 
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There seems to be little current interest in psychosurgery as a 
treatment for criminal behavior in general.  In part this may stem from 
the stigma that has attached to the field since the demise of the prefrontal 
lobotomy.  But it is also the case that a plausible neurosurgical remedy 
would require some kind of “criminal brain region” that could be 
destroyed or isolated. 
The use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and other 
forms of neuroimaging has sparked great interest in correlating activity 
in particular regions of the brain with mental states or behaviors.  The 
neuroscience of crime seems to have focused more on underactive 
regions, not overactive ones, at least in recent years.36  In the past, 
though, the surgical removal or destruction of the amygdala was 
explored as a way to control extreme aggressiveness.  There appears to 
have been substantial research with this method through the 1960s and 
1970s, but its use has “geometrically decreased” in the last twenty 
years.37  Given the many known functions of the amygdala, it seems 
unlikely that the procedure will regain popularity.  At least one 
researcher in Japan experimented in the early 1960s with destruction of 
portions of the hypothalamus to treat aggressive behavior,38 but this 
procedure seems not to have caught on.  As a result, there seems to be 
little or no neurosurgical research currently aimed at criminal behavior, 
whether through aggression or otherwise. 
The one notable exception is addiction, which some researchers have 
associated with activity in particular brain regions.  There have been 
some substantial recent efforts to use neurosurgery to treat addiction.  
Wayne Hall, an Australian expert on addiction, has written about two 
such efforts.  In China, over 500 patients had a structure in their brains 
called the nucleus accumbens ablated before the Chinese government 
halted the procedure in 2004.  This brain region seems to be involved in 
the “reward” experienced by users of many drugs of abuse.  In a similar 
effort, over 300 patients in Russia had a different brain region, the 
cingulate gyrus, removed.  This area is thought to be involved in 
compulsive behaviors.  The Russian government stopped these efforts in  
 
                                                                                                                       
10,000 of the procedures were performed between 1952 and 1955, though he argues that that number 
is probably low.  Id.  Allowing for a few procedures after 1955, a total of 30,000 seems a reasonable 
estimate. 
 36. See Mobbs et al., supra note 2, at 693–94. 
 37. Kostas N. Fountas & Joseph R. Smith, Historical Evolution of Stereotactic Amygdalotomy 
for the Management of Severe Aggression, 106 J. NEUROSURG. 710, 710–13 (2007). 
 38. K. Sano et al., Postero-Medial Hypothalamotomy in the Treatment of Aggressive Behav-
iors, 27 CONFINIA NEUROLOGICA 164, 164–67 (1966). 
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2002.  In neither case was there any formal approval of the procedure as 
either safe or effective.39 
C. Deep Brain Stimulation 
Deep brain stimulation (“DBS”) is a different method of affecting 
brain function.  While neurosurgery is essentially destructive, DBS is 
not.  In DBS, one or more thin, insulated wires, called “leads,” typically 
containing four electrodes, are surgically implanted quite precisely into 
particular regions of the patient’s brain while a battery-powered 
“implanted pulse generator” is implanted under the shoulder or in the 
abdomen.  The implanted pulse generator is then set to provide electrical 
stimulation through the leads at a particular voltage and frequency, 
which the physicians can change.40  In some applications, the patient is 
able to turn the stimulation off and on. 
That DBS sometimes works is clear.  Over the past decade the 
United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approved DBS for 
treatment of Parkinson’s disease, essential tremor, and dystonia.41  How 
it works, however, is not very clear.  In some situations the added 
electrical stimulation increases the activity by nearby neurons; in others, 
it represses it.  The implantation procedure carries all the risks of 
neurosurgery.  In addition, DBS sometimes has psychiatric side-effects, 
ranging from compulsive gambling and hypersexuality to hallucinations, 
apathy, and depression.  The side effects can often be mitigated or 
eliminated by changing the stimulation voltage and frequency and are 
also thought to be largely—if not entirely—reversible by removal of the 
DBS. 
DBS has also been used, but is not yet generally accepted, for other 
problems, including chronic pain,42 cluster headache,43 and Tourette’s 
syndrome44 as well as affective disorders such as depression45 and 
                                                          
 39. Wayne Hall, Stereotactic Neurosurgical Treatment of Addiction: Minimizing the Chances 
of Another “Great and Desperate Cure,” 101 ADDICTION 1, 1–3 (2006). 
 40. Morten L. Kringelbach et al., Translational Principles of Deep Brain Stimulation, 8 NA-
TURE REVIEWS NEUROSCI 623, 623 (2007). 
 41. See id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Linda Ackermans et al., Deep Brain Stimulation in Tourette’s Syndrome: Two Targets?, 21 
MOVEMENT DISORDERS 709 (2006); Veerle Visser-Vandewalle et al., Chronic Bilateral Thalamic 
Stimulation: A New Therapeutic Approach in Intractable Tourette Syndrome, 99 J. NEUROSURG. 
1094 (2003). 
 45. Helen S. Mayberg et al., Deep Brain Stimulation for Treatment-Resistant Depression, 45 
NEURON 651 (2005). 
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obsessive-compulsive disorder.46  There have also been reports of its use 
to restore consciousness or alertness to a patient in a minimally 
conscious state47 and to treat obesity.48  One trial of its use for obesity 
has recently led to a very surprising increase in the (single) subject’s 
memory,49 leading the researchers to begin testing the technique in 
subjects with Alzheimer’s disease.50 
And, more relevant to the criminal justice system, there is at least 
one report of the technique having been used to treat “aggressiveness.”  
In 2005 Angelo Franzini and colleagues reported using DBS in the 
posteromedial hypothalamus on two mentally retarded patients “with 
aggressive and disruptive behavior and resistant to any pharmacological 
treatment.”51  The researchers reported “consistent improvement of 
disruptive behavior in both patients at the follow-up evaluation 1 year 
later.”52 
Different reports have linked parts of the prefrontal cortex to 
criminal behavior, usually on the theory that the criminals lack 
appropriate impulse control because of under-activation of those regions.  
Other areas that have been implicated in criminal behavior include the 
hippocampus, the amygdala, the corpus callosum, and the hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal axis.53  DBS provides a plausible method for 
stimulating greater activity in regions where diminished function is 
thought to play a role in crime.  It could also provide an adjustable, 
intermittent, and reversible method of inhibiting activity in areas where 
over-activity may contribute to criminal activity and thus serve some of 
the functions of neurosurgery, but without its permanence.  Of course, at 
this stage any such uses of DBS are highly speculative.  On the other 
hand, uses of DBS seem to be spreading rapidly as neurosurgeons try 
different regions for different conditions.  The extension of DBS research 
                                                          
 46. B. J. Nuttin et al., Long-Term Electrical Capsular Stimulation in Patients with Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder, 52 NEUROSURGERY 1263 (2003). 
 47. N. D. Schiff et al., Behavioural Improvements with Thalamic Stimulation After Severe 
Traumatic Brain Injury, 448 NATURE 600 (2007). 
 48. Clement Hamani et al., Memory Enhancement Induced by Hypothalamic/Fornix Deep 
Brain Stimulation, 63 ANNALS OF NEUROLOGY 119 (2008) and Supplemental Materials, DOI: 
10.1002/ana.21295 (2008).  The DBS was only temporarily successful for this patient, as the patient 
eventually turned the stimulator off, resumed binge eating, and regained the twenty-seven pounds he 
had lost. 
 49. Id. at 122–23. 
 50. Denise Gellene, Deep Brain Stimulation Boosts Memory, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2008, at A18. 
 51. Angelo Franzini et al., Stimulation of the Posterior Hypothalamus for Medically Intractable 
Impulsive and Violent Behavior, 83 STEREOTACT. FUNCT. NEUROSURG. 63 (2005). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Mobbs et al., supra note 2. 
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to criminality, beyond the one Franzini article, seems likely. Its success 
is much less certain. 
One new method similar to DBS should be noted.  Transcranial 
magnetic stimulation (“TMS”) is a non-invasive procedure for 
stimulating or repressing neuronal activity inside the brain.  It works 
through a magnetic field generated by a coil held close to the outside of 
the subject’s head.  The magnetic field penetrates the skull and induces a 
mild electric current in the brain, which affects the firing of neurons.  
TMS is being investigated for a wide range of clinical uses, but it 
remains unclear how well it will work.  One problem with the procedure 
is that it is fairly indiscriminate; the magnetic field within the brain fills a 
cone-shaped volume pointing inward from the location of the coil outside 
the skull.  Except in the outermost layer of the brain, it cannot be used to 
affect neurons in a precise location without also affecting shallower 
neurons.  Still, if it could be used to treat criminal behavior, it would 
avoid the brain surgery and implants needed in DBS and their 
consequent risks. 
D. Anti-Drug Vaccines 
The last approach, vaccines, seems likely to be restricted to illegal 
drugs.  Researchers—and pharmaceutical companies—are working on 
vaccines that effectively block drugs of abuse from having any effect.  
As the use of such drugs is often itself a crime and is also often 
associated with other criminal behavior, blocking the effects of those 
drugs might, in theory, significantly reduce crime.  In fact, Frank Vocci, 
the director of treatment research and development at the United States 
National Institute for Drug Addiction, recently predicted that a cocaine 
vaccine would be available within one to ten years.54 
The idea behind drug vaccines is simple—to use the human immune 
system to prevent the drug of abuse from reaching its target in the brain.  
The cocaine molecule by itself is too small to generate antibodies in the 
human immune system.  A cocaine vaccine in clinical trials, the so-called 
TA-CD vaccine, attaches cocaine to a large protein from the cholera 
bacterium.  The body creates antibodies to both the bacterial protein and 
its attached cocaine.  An early trial on 114 people seeking treatment for 
cocaine addiction showed that cocaine users who were vaccinated were 
much more likely to reduce their cocaine use significantly than those 
                                                          
 54. Hilary Hylton, A Drug to End Drug Addiction, TIME, Jan. 9, 2008, http://www.time.com 
/health/article/0,8599,1701864,00.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2008). 
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who were not vaccinated.55  This vaccine is intended for users who want 
to stop; it may also be possible to vaccinate non-users, including 
children, so that they “get no kick from cocaine.”  Researchers are 
attempting to create similar vaccines for other drugs of abuse, such as 
heroin and methamphetamine.56  None of these vaccines has, as yet, been 
approved for clinical use and it remains unclear whether any will be, let 
alone how effective they will be. 
II. SAFETY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
Excitement about advances in neuroscience may combine with the 
huge interest in reducing criminal behavior to lead to the rapid adoption 
of new methods to “treat criminal brains.”  The example of the prefrontal 
lobotomy is a warning that such methods may well end up doing more 
harm than good.  The criminal justice system should not directly 
intervene in people’s brains unless the intervention has been proven safe 
and effective.  To do so would impose unreasonable costs on a highly 
unpopular population—unreasonable either because the interventions are 
unsafe or because they are ineffective, in which case any cost or risk is 
unreasonable.  Yet when it comes to interventions against criminal 
behavior, proving safety and efficacy is fraught with difficulties, except 
perhaps for interventions against addiction. 
This section of the essay first discusses the history of the lobotomy, 
then looks at today’s regulatory framework for such interventions, before 
describing some of the special problems of testing the safety and efficacy 
of these methods.  It ends by discussing the risk that interventions might 
be tried that have not been proven safe and effective. 
A. The Prefrontal Lobotomy 
In 1995 Victor Swayze published a broad historical review of 
prefrontal lobotomy.57  According to Swayze, Moniz initially proposed 
the lobotomy as a controlled surgical procedure for particularly severe 
cases.  Its use quickly expanded, due largely to the efforts of two 
Americans, Walter Freeman (a neurologist) and James Watts (a 
neurosurgeon), to a substantially different procedure used in a much 
wider range of cases.  The procedure was never rigorously assessed 
                                                          
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. The following discussion is based largely on Swayze, supra note 33. 
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before being put into broad clinical use.  Its rapid adoption, particularly 
in the United States, was at least in part a consequence of concern over a 
dramatic increase in the number of people in mental institutions.  Some 
efforts were made at the time to determine the efficacy of the procedure; 
one review of over 9,000 cases in the United Kingdom found that 
patients were recovered or greatly improved in forty-one percent of the 
cases.  On the other hand, as early as 1949 another researcher concluded 
that patients who received the procedure improved at the same rate as 
those who did not.  Two reviews in the 1970s ultimately concluded that 
all of the studies had such severe methodological problems that the 
efficacy of the procedure during this period cannot be determined. 
It was soon clear, however, that the procedure had costs to those who 
received it.  Swayze writes: 
Although leukotomy patients appeared to have therapeutic gains in 
regard to reduced “tension” or violent outbursts, it was apparent as 
early as the late 1930s that this was not without a price in relation to the 
effects on personality.  By the mid-1940s significant and quite severe 
changes in patients’ personalities were being reported.  Hutton . . . in 
England reported one wife saying, “His soul appears to be destroyed; 
he is not the man I once knew,” and in the words of a sister, “He is 
without soul now.”  Rylander . . . in Sweden reported a mother saying, 
“She is my daughter but yet a different person.  She is with me in body 
but her soul is in some way lost.”  Hoffman . . . in the United States 
reported that “these patients are not only no longer distressed by their 
mental conflicts but also seem to have little capacity for any emotional 
experiences—pleasurable or otherwise.  They are described by the 
nurses and the doctors, over and over, as dull, apathetic, listless, 
without drive or initiative, flat, lethargic, placid and unconcerned, 
childlike, docile, needing pushing, passive, lacking in spontaneity, 
without aim or purpose, preoccupied and dependent.”58 
An increased realization of those costs combined with the development 
of the first drugs that showed any efficacy against psychosis led to the 
decline and fall of the prefrontal lobotomy, but not before about 30,000 
people had been subjected to the procedure in the United States. 
B. The Regulatory Framework 
In the United States no single regulatory framework covers all the 
possible brain interventions to treat criminal behavior.  Pharmacological, 
DBS, and vaccine interventions are regulated in various ways by the 
                                                          
 58. Id. at 507–08 (citations omitted). 
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FDA; psychosurgery is not regulated by the FDA at all, but may be 
subject to some state statutory control. 
The FDA regulates pharmacological interventions as drugs, vaccines 
as biologics, and DBS as a medical device.  In each case the 
manufacturer must prove to the FDA’s satisfaction that the intervention 
is safe and effective before it may be distributed in the United States.59  
How the FDA reviews new products for safety and efficacy varies across 
these three areas, but, largely because of the possibilities of “off-label 
use,” the ultimate relevance of the FDA’s review process in the existing 
legal framework is unclear. 
Under the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, the drug approval 
process begins when a sponsor seeks FDA permission to begin human 
tests of the new drug, through an Investigational New Drug exemption 
(an “IND”).60  Once the exemption is granted, the sponsor proceeds with 
human trials, typically in three phases—a very small Phase 1 to test for 
safety, a larger Phase 2 to begin testing for efficacy, and a much larger 
Phase 3 to test for dosage as well as to test for further safety and efficacy.  
If the results of these controlled clinical trials are favorable, the sponsor 
will then submit a Premarket Approval Application to convince the FDA 
that the drug is safe and effective for a particular indication.61  At that 
point, the FDA not only makes a substantive decision about safety and 
efficacy but, if it does approve the drug, it must agree to the exact 
wording of the “label” for the product, which sets out the product’s 
dosage, indications, contra-indications, and side-effects.62  Achieving 
FDA approval of a new drug typically takes about ten years and costs 
hundreds of millions of dollars. 
The FDA regulates vaccines under a different statute—the Public 
Health Service Act—but in a manner fundamentally similar to its 
regulation of drugs.63  The sponsor again must receive an Investigational 
New Drug Exemption and then proceed through, typically, three phases 
of controlled human clinical trials.  If the trials are successful, the 
sponsor will submit a Biologicals License Application to convince the 
FDA that the vaccine is safe and effective for a particular use.  If the 
vaccine is approved, its labeling also requires FDA approval. 
                                                          
 59. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.20 (2007).  The terms “safe” and “effective” are not, of course, self-
defining.  The FDA has substantial discretion in how it applies them; a treatment for deadly pancre-
atic cancer might be judged safe and effective far more easily than a treatment for teenage acne. 
 60. See id. § 312.21. 
 61. See id. § 314.50. 
 62. See id. § 314.105. 
 63. See 42 U.S.C. § 262. 
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Medical devices face similar but weaker regulation.  Only new 
“Class III” devices, those with the greatest risk, must be proved safe and 
effective through clinical trials, which are allowed only after the FDA 
has granted the sponsor the device equivalent of an IND, an 
Investigational Device Exemption (an “IDE”).64  These trials are 
typically much smaller and shorter than clinical trials for new drugs and 
thus cost only a small fraction of the drug trials.  Even among Class III 
devices, a device that is “substantially similar” to a device that was used 
before 1976 (the date of the crucial Medical Device Amendments to the 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act) or that was approved after 1976 may be 
approved without any new clinical trials through what is called the 
Section 510(k) process. 
All three FDA regulatory systems share a significant loophole, 
however, called “off-label use.”  The FDA approves drugs, vaccines, and 
medical devices only for particular uses—against a particular disease, or 
with a defined set of patients (children, adults, the elderly).  But once the 
FDA has approved a drug, vaccine, or device for one purpose, a 
physician may prescribe it for any purpose, limited only by the 
physician’s judgment and potential malpractice liability.65  The sponsor 
is not allowed to “market” an approved drug, vaccine, or device for an 
off-label use, so it may not advertise it for such a use to the public or to 
physicians.  A drug, vaccine, or device approved for one use may 
therefore be legally sold and used, but not marketed, for another.  Thus, 
Depo-Provera, approved for use by women for birth control, may be used 
for chemical castration, or a particular deep brain stimulation device, 
approved for use for Parkinson’s disease, could be used to try to repress 
criminal behavior.66 
Oddly enough, the widespread off-label use of approved drugs, 
biologics, and devices would not trigger FDA regulation, but research 
into those uses often would.  The FDA’s regulations provide that 
research involving an off-label use of a device requires an IDE, at least 
where the research has to be approved by an institutional review board 
(“IRB”) and the IRB concludes that it involves a “significant risk 
                                                          
 64. See 21 C.F.R. § 812.2. 
 65. See id. § 312.2.  Drugs approved for over-the-counter sales by the FDA do not require a 
prescription and can legally be used by any consumer for any indication.  Only a few medical de-
vices are “restricted” and hence the equivalent of prescription drugs; most can be ordered by patients 
without a physician’s approval.  Cardiac pacemakers, heart valves, and hearing aids are examples of 
restricted devices. 
 66. And, for devices, a DBS device that was substantially similar to an approved device could 
be approved under Section 510(k) without new trials of safety and efficacy. 
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device.”67  Similar but slightly different provisions govern off-label 
research use of drugs and vaccines.68 
Surgery is not regulated by the FDA, except to the extent that its 
regulation of devices and drugs has incidental effects on surgical 
procedures.  In the aftermath of the prefrontal lobotomy, many states did 
regulate psychosurgery.  As of 2002, twenty-two American jurisdictions 
restricted psychosurgery in various ways.69  Most of the statutes prohibit 
involuntary use of psychosurgery or impose special requirements for 
informed consent, by the subject or the subject’s guardian, but their 
breadth and their specific terms differ widely.  Texas, for example, 
merely exempts psychosurgery from the scope of medical powers of 
attorney.70  California, on the other hand, passed a confusing welter of 
statutory provisions on psychosurgery in the 1970s.  These prohibit 
involuntary psychosurgery on prisoners71 or those in institutions for the 
developmentally disabled or the mentally ill.72  For prisoners who 
volunteer for psychosurgery, the statute requires that a court determine 
that “the state has proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that the 
confined person has the capacity for informed consent and has 
manifested his informed consent.”73  For everyone, “psychosurgery, 
wherever administered,” must meet a complicated procedure for 
informed consent and for unanimous approval of the surgery on that 
particular patient by a panel of three physicians other than the treating 
physician.74  Although the statutes use different definitions for 
psychosurgery, they all seem broad enough to cover DBS as well as 
destructive psychosurgery.75 
                                                          
 67. 21 C.F.R. § 812.66 (2007). 
 68. Id. § 312.2.  The main difference is that the investigator, and not the IRB, has to conclude 
whether the different use significantly increases the risks or decreases their acceptability. 
 69. Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli, Still Stuck in the Cuckoo’s Nest: Why Do Courts Continue to Rely 
on Antiquated Mental Illness Research?, 69 TENN. L. REV. 987, 1040, n. 282. 
 70. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §166.152 (2001). 
 71. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2670.5(b), 2670 (West 2000). 
 72. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325(g), 4503(h) (West 1998). 
 73. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2679 (West 2000). 
 74. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5326.6 (West 1998). 
 75. The section dealing with prisoners defines psychosurgery broadly to include “lobotomy, 
stereotactic surgery, electronic, chemical or other destruction of brain tissues, or implantation of 
electrodes into brain tissue.”  CAL. PENAL CODE § 2670.5(c) (West 2000).  The section dealing with 
non-prisoners defines psychosurgery as: 
those operations currently referred to as lobotomy, psychiatric surgery, and behavioral 
surgery and all other forms of brain surgery if the surgery is performed for the purpose of 
any of the following: 
(1) Modification or control of thoughts, feelings, actions, or behavior rather than the 
treatment of a known and diagnosed physical disease of the brain. 
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C. Difficulties in Proving Safety and Efficacy 
Between the lack of federal regulation of psychosurgery and the off-
label use loophole in federal regulation of drugs, vaccines, and medical 
devices, it is not at all clear that neuroscience interventions would have 
to be proven safe and effective for controlling criminal behavior.  
Pharmacological interventions against addiction have gone through the 
FDA’s drug approval process, while the use of MPA for chemical 
castration of sex offenders is an off-label use of the drug approved for 
use by women for birth control.76  Even if there were a general 
requirement for proof of safety and efficacy, however, such proof, in this 
context, would be difficult to provide, for both scientific and social 
reasons.  These reasons include the limitations of animal models in 
dealing with human behaviors and brains, but, more fundamentally, 
revolve around the practical and ethical difficulties of finding volunteers 
for clinical trials to test prevention of criminal behavior, as well as the 
political risks such trials pose. 
1. The Limited Relevance of Non-Human Research 
The relative uselessness of non-human research in studying brain 
interventions against criminal behavior is an important scientific barrier.  
Non-human animals have neither the interplay between motives and 
social norms nor the brains necessary to allow us to put much weight on 
such testing. 
It can no longer be argued that other animals do not act in ways that 
would be criminal if done by humans.  Acts that, done by humans to 
humans, would lead to charges of murder, rape, and theft have been 
observed in non-human animals.  The problem is whether those 
behaviors are sufficiently similar in their motivations (and presumably 
their causal links in the brain) to equivalent human behavior to provide a 
good test of an intervention to control the human behavior.  Male 
                                                                                                                       
(2) Modification of normal brain function or normal brain tissue in order to control 
thoughts, feelings, action, or behavior. 
(3) Treatment of abnormal brain function or abnormal brain tissue in order to modify 
thoughts, feelings, actions or behavior when the abnormality is not an established cause 
for those thoughts, feelings, actions, or behavior. 
Id. § 5325(g).  See also the nearly identical § 4503(h). 
 76. Interestingly, the makers of naltrexone received FDA approval for it both for use in opioid 
addiction treatment, in 1984, and again for its use to treat alcoholism, in 1994.  Presumably, the firm 
thought the advantages in being able to advertise naltrexone to the large potential market of alcohol-
ics was worth the cost for additional approval. 
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chimpanzees in the wild are known to patrol their band’s boundaries and 
to capture, kill, and eat chimpanzees from other bands.  If we were able 
to find an intervention in the brains of chimpanzees that prevented that 
behavior, how confident would we be that it would prevent similar 
human behavior? 
And, of course, for a complex set of reasons involving cost, ethics, 
and public relations, chimpanzees or any other great apes are highly 
unlikely to be used for such research.  Extrapolating from the behavior of 
monkeys to that of humans would be hard; moving from rodent behavior 
to human criminal behavior seems nearly impossible. 
Even if the behaviors were similar, though, the brains are different.  
Human brains are not, in their essential components, that different from 
those of other mammals, but humans have a vastly larger cortex, 
particularly the frontal and prefrontal cortex.  To the extent that human 
criminal behavior involves the cortex, our experimental animals may 
well have no equivalent brain structures or circuits in which to intervene.  
Even interventions in brain structures that humans and non-humans have 
in common, such as the amygdala or the hypothalamus, are likely to have 
different consequences in humans than in non-humans.  The human 
amygdala is acting and reacting in conjunction with the huge human 
cortex; the rat amygdala is not. 
It is always difficult, and uncertain, to extrapolate from non-human 
tests to humans—a reason that human clinical trials are almost always 
required.  The non-human experiments might provide useful information 
about humans; addiction studies with non-humans provide one good 
example.  But in studying this kind of trait—criminal behaviors—in this 
organ—the brain—non-human experiments seem likely to be of 
unusually limited help. 
2. Problems of Human Trials—Other than Consent 
Unfortunately, human studies of these kinds of interventions will be 
unusually difficult.  The difficulties can be classed as practical and 
ethical, though political problems lurk in each category. 
Human trials present significant practical problems.  Phase 1 trials 
are studies of an intervention’s short-term safety, usually done with a 
handful of subjects who are typically healthy young adults.  (If the 
intervention is thought to be particularly risky, as are many anti-cancer 
drugs, sick patients will be used for Phase 1 trials.)  The typical FDA 
Phase 2 or 3 clinical trial is controlled, randomized, and, preferably, 
double-blinded.  Out of a large number of subjects, some receive the 
intervention, while some receive an alternative drug, a placebo, or 
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nothing.  A random process is used to determine which subjects get what.  
And neither the subjects nor the researchers know what any given subject 
got until the trial results are analyzed, although in many cases a separate 
Data Safety Monitoring Board will have access to unblinded results 
during the trial to see whether the trial should be stopped as unsafe. 
Phase 1 trials may be practicable for at least some anti-crime 
interventions, particularly drugs and vaccines.  It should not be 
particularly hard to find a small number of volunteers to take a drug, with 
presumably reversible effects, in order to assess its short-term effects.  
The fact that a vaccine will often have long-term, if not permanent, 
effects on a subject’s immune system may make volunteers a bit harder 
to find, but Phase 1 trials still seem plausible.  It seems less likely that 
healthy volunteers could be found for DBS.  The leads are implanted into 
particular spots in the brain through neurosurgery, with some necessary 
risks, and the process of adjusting the stimulation can be long and 
difficult.  And it seems highly unlikely that healthy volunteers would be 
willing to undergo psychosurgery, with its consequent destruction of 
parts of their brains, to test the procedure’s safety.  For psychosurgery 
and, probably, DBS, researchers will need to find affected people—
people who engage in the criminal behaviors to be controlled—who are 
willing to volunteer as test subjects.  Finding such volunteers is likely to 
be very hard. 
The same issue of finding affected volunteers will become much 
more of a problem for all four technologies in Phase 2 and 3 trials, when 
the number of subjects needed will be measured in the hundreds or 
thousands.  Those trials are usually populated by patients with a 
particular disease who hope that the experimental treatment will help, or 
even cure, them.  Again, it is not as clear that those who engage in 
criminal behavior will be eager to volunteer for experimental 
interventions in their brains to treat their “disorder.”  There may be 
enough motivated volunteers for some kinds of interventions, 
particularly those aimed at addiction and possibly some sex offenders; it 
seems less likely that other criminals will be so eager to be “treated” for 
their criminal tendencies, particularly when the treatment will require 
brain surgery, either for psychosurgery or for DBS implantation.77 
Assume, however, that sufficient volunteers are found.  How does 
such a clinical trial work?  Presumably, a large number of people are 
randomized into a treatment group, receiving the drug, psychosurgery, 
                                                          
 77. Note that to the extent criminal behavior is correlated with anti-social behavior, it may be 
especially difficult to find altruistic volunteers for these tests. 
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DBS, or vaccine, and a control group.  The control group might receive a 
placebo or some other standard treatment.78  The trial subjects would 
then be followed to see whether the treatment reduced the criminal 
behavior in question (was it effective?) and what, if any, adverse effects 
it had (was it safe?).  In the context of this kind of study, such a trial 
raises several concerns. 
First, in any trial, the subjects need to be sufficiently likely to 
develop the studied end-points to provide a useful test of the 
intervention.  Testing an intervention against heart attacks in a general 
but young population would require a huge trial because heart attacks are 
rare at early ages.  To test an intervention against criminal behavior 
without having an enormous trial, the trial subjects would have to be 
likely to engage in the studied behavior.  Thus, the trial would likely be 
studying a population drawn from the criminal justice system (or its 
juvenile equivalent).  For particular kinds of criminal behavior, like sex 
offenses, it may be a specific population.  For criminal behavior in 
general, it will be boys and young men. 
Second, the measured end points to the trial will presumably be 
instances of criminal behavior.  Some medical clinical trials use 
“surrogate markers,” such as HIV-load instead of deaths from AIDS, or 
cholesterol level instead of coronary artery disease, because of the 
difficulties of running trials large or long enough to measure the true 
end-points of concern.  It is hard to see what the surrogate markers would 
be for most criminal behavior—self-reported thoughts about committing 
crimes?  If the end-point to be measured is criminal behavior, there are 
likely to be problems in measuring it.  Assuming the subjects do not 
honestly report all their criminal acts to the researchers, cases of criminal 
behavior will have to be extrapolated from criminal arrests or 
convictions, both weak markers.  While one could hope that they would 
be equally weak markers for both the treatment group and the control 
                                                          
 78. Some of the interventions might be very hard to make blind, to either the subjects or the 
researchers.  Drugs and vaccines can easily be simulated by placebos or other treatments; psycho-
surgery and DBS would be more difficult.  It seems unlikely that a trial would—or ethically could—
undertake the risks to the subjects (and the costs to the trial) of performing sham brain surgery or 
implanting but not turning on a DBS system.  Sham brain surgery was used in at least one clinical 
trial of a treatment for Parkinson’s disease, but not without controversy—even though in that case 
the holes the surgeons drilled in the skulls of the placebo group did not go all the way through the 
skull.  See Thomas B. Freeman et al., Use of Placebo Surgery in Controlled Trials of a Cellular-
Based Therapy for Parkinson’s Disease, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 988, 988–92 (1999); G.R. Gillett, 
Unnecessary Holes in the Head, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., Nov.–Dec. 2001, at 1; Ruth Macklin, 
The Ethical Problems with Sham Surgery in Clinical Research, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 992, 992–96 
(1999); Franklin G. Miller, Sham Surgery: An Ethical Analysis, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Fall 2003, at 41;  
Charles Weijer, I Need a Placebo Like I Need a Hole in the Head, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 69, 69–72 
(2002). 
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group, it is possible that the treatment could make the subjects more or 
less likely to be caught than the control group, adding another 
uncertainty into the trial. 
But the fact that crimes are the studied end-points will cause other, 
possibly more serious, political problems.  Victims of crime, and the 
general public, may not be happy about a clinical trial that observes 
criminal tendencies, but does not try to report or stop its trial subjects 
from committing crimes.  The complaint may not be fair; after all, if the 
trial works, the crime rate should go down for the treated group and 
should not go up for the non-treated group.  Yet the prospect of political 
unhappiness, public relations problems, and even lawsuits by a crime 
victim could well give a potential trial sponsor pause. 
3. Consent-Related Problems of Human Trials 
Now take away the assumption that sufficient “true” volunteers 
could be found to participate in this research.  How will such a trial be 
able to attract hundreds or thousands of subjects who are likely to engage 
in criminal behavior?  The only likely answer is to recruit them from 
those who are already enmeshed in the criminal justice system by 
offering them some leniency in return for their participation.  But this 
scenario causes its own set of ethical, legal, and political problems.79 
The ethical problem comes from the desire to have “true” volunteers 
for human subjects research and not people who have agreed to take part 
because of some “undue inducement.”  The foundational document of 
research ethics, the Nuremberg Code, begins the first of its ten 
requirements with: 
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.  
This means that the person involved . . . should be so situated as to be 
able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention of any 
element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior 
form of constraint or coercion . . . .80 
                                                          
 79. It may also create another practical problem.  Subjects may behave particularly well during 
the trial in order to win more lenient treatment (or to win approval for the treatment that in turn will 
lead to their more lenient treatment).  To the extent that the study relies on self-reports from the sub-
jects, they may also lie to improve how effective the treatment appears.  If the study is a blinded con-
trolled study, this may not matter as both the treatment and the placebo group will have the same 
incentives to behave or to lie, but the lack of a control group or flawed or non-existent blinding 
could cause problems. 
 80. Trials of War Criminals before the Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, 
Vol. 2, 181–82.  Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949. 
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The problem with using people in the criminal justice system comes 
from whether a person can be said to be acting without “force, . . . 
duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion” 
when participation in the research is likely to reduce the intervention of 
the criminal justice system in his life. 
Those potential subjects might have a variety of connections with the 
criminal justice system.  Some will be imprisoned.  Their criminal 
behavior could be studied in the prison or jail, which would provide them 
with an opportunity to engage in some but not all varieties of criminal 
behavior, or after their release.  They could be persuaded to volunteer by 
earlier release or by better conditions while imprisoned, or both.  Others 
could already be “at liberty,” but facing criminal charges or probation or 
parole revocation that might not be pressed if they volunteered for the 
study.  Still others could be currently on probation or parole but could be 
offered either better terms or an earlier end to their supervised status.  In 
any of these cases, one could easily doubt whether they are “so situated 
as to be able to exercise free power of choice”81 when offered a deal for 
their participation in a clinical trial.  It is noteworthy that the Nuremberg 
Doctors trial dealt mainly with offenses against concentration camp 
inmates and prisoners of war; protection of prisoners was not an 
incidental aspect of the Nuremberg Code. 
When research involves actual prisoners, this ethical concern has 
been recognized in the federal regulations governing human subjects 
research as the so-called Common Rule.82  Technically, the “common” 
part of the Common Rule is Subpart A.  Subpart A deals only in passing 
with prisoners.  It requires, for instance, that in assessing whether the 
choice of research subjects is equitable, an IRB “should be particularly 
cognizant of the special problems of research involving vulnerable 
populations, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally 
disabled persons, or economically or educationally disadvantaged 
persons.”83  It further provides that IRBs must find that “[w]hen some or 
all of the subjects are likely to be vulnerable to coercion or undue 
                                                          
 81. Id. 
 82. The Common Rule is so called because it was adopted in common by over sixteen federal 
agencies, almost all of the agencies that perform or fund human subjects research.  Each agency is 
bound by its own version of the Common Rule, but most of them parallel closely the HHS rule, codi-
fied at 45 C.F.R. § 46, Subpart A.  45 C.F.R. § 46 (2007).  The FDA, although part of the HHS, has 
its own slightly different version of the Common Rule.  21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56 (2007).  The FDA, like 
most federal agencies, stopped at adopting Subpart A of the HHS version of the Common Rule.  The 
HHS version of the Common Rule also contains subparts B, C, and D, dealing specifically with spe-
cial issues presented by research on pregnant women, fetuses, and neonates; prisoners; and children. 
 83. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(3) (2007). 
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influence, such as children, prisoners, pregnant women, mentally 
disabled persons, or economically or educationally disadvantaged 
persons, additional safeguards have been included in the study to protect 
the rights and welfare of these subjects.”84 
But the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 
regulations governing human subjects research goes beyond Subpart A to 
include, in subparts B, C, and D, respectively, special protections for 
women, fetuses, and neonates; prisoners; and children.  Subpart C states: 
Inasmuch as prisoners may be under constraints because of their 
incarceration which could affect their ability to make a truly voluntary 
and uncoerced decision whether or not to participate as subjects in 
research, it is the purpose of this subpart to provide additional 
safeguards for the protection of prisoners involved in activities to 
which this subpart is applicable.85 
The regulations define the term “prisoner” broadly to include those 
in any “penal institution” as a result of a criminal or a civil statute or 
confined before trial or sentencing, as well as those in “other facilities” 
as a result of criminal diversion programs.86  Section 46.306 limits 
permissible research with prisoners to only four categories.  The first 
category seems the most relevant for research into controlling criminal 
behavior: “Study of the possible causes, effects, and processes of 
incarceration, and of criminal behavior, provided that the study presents 
no more than minimal risk and no more than inconvenience to the 
subjects . . . .”87  Note, though, that the language talks about “causes, 
effects, and processes . . . of criminal behavior,” not the control of 
criminal behavior.  More importantly, it only authorizes “no more than 
minimal risk” research.  Research into new uses of drugs, devices, 
vaccines, or surgery is highly unlikely to qualify as “minimal risk.” 
Two of the other three categories might be stretched to include such 
research.  One involves “[r]esearch on conditions particularly affecting 
prisoners as a class (for example . . . research on social and psychological 
problems such as alcoholism, drug addiction and sexual assaults).”88  A 
propensity to engage in criminal behavior probably qualifies as a 
condition “particularly affecting prisoners as a class,” though that seems 
a bit tautological.  The other authorizes “[r]esearch on practices, both 
                                                          
 84. Id. § 46.111(b). 
 85. Id. § 46.302. 
 86. Id. § 46.303(c). 
 87. Id. § 46.306(a)(2)(i). 
 88. Id. § 46.306(a)(2)(iii). 
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innovative and accepted, which have the intent and reasonable 
probability of improving the health or well-being of the subject.”89  
Again, one could certainly argue that preventing criminal behavior would 
improve the “health and well-being of the subject,” but such an argument 
feels more than a little Orwellian.  This provision also requires that the 
intervention have a “reasonable probability” of success, which may be 
difficult to meet.  Each of these provisions requires the Secretary of HHS 
to consult “with appropriate experts including experts in penology 
medicine and ethics, and published notice, in the Federal Register, of his 
intent to approve such research . . . .”90  That consultation and public 
notice provision will serve to deter at least some such research. 
Finally, even if the research is for a permissible purpose, the IRB 
approving it91 must find, among other things, that: 
(2) Any possible advantages accruing to the prisoner through his or her 
participation in the research, when compared to the general living 
conditions, medical care, quality of food, amenities and opportunity for 
earnings in the prison, are not of such a magnitude that his or her ability 
to weigh the risks of the research against the value of such advantages 
in the limited choice environment of the prison is impaired; 
(3) The risks involved in the research are commensurate with risks that 
would be accepted by non-prisoner volunteers . . . .92 
So there will be substantial uncertainties about the legality of doing 
any research on brain-based criminal behavior controls.  If the research is 
done with prisoners, broadly defined, and either with funding from HHS 
or by an institution that has given HHS an assurance that it will abide by 
HHS rules for all its human subjects research (basically all American 
research universities and institutes), it will have to follow Subpart C.  But 
such research (1) will not fit easily into the only permissible categories of 
Subpart C, (2) will require the HHS Secretary to consult with an expert 
group and publish findings, and (3) will be subject to special scrutiny by 
an IRB.  Pharmaceutical, biotechnology, or medical device firms may 
not have given HHS such assurances and may be able to proceed under 
the FDA’s regulations, which only incorporate Subpart A, but even that  
 
                                                          
 89. Id. § 46.306(a)(2)(iv). 
 90. Id. 
 91. The regulation also requires that, for IRBs approving research on prisoners, “[a]t least one 
member of the Board shall be a prisoner, or a prisoner representative with appropriate background 
and experience to serve in that capacity . . . .”  Id. § 46.304(b). 
 92. Id. § 46.305(a). 
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requires special IRB attention to research with prisoners—and the firms 
would not be able to collaborate with universities. 
One might try to do the research with crime-prone subjects who were 
not “prisoners” under the meaning of Subpart C.  That makes the legal 
situation less complicated.  IRB approval will still be needed if the 
research is being done by an institution that has given an assurance to 
HHS or, under the FDA regulations, if the research is to be used for an 
FDA submission, but the special protections of Subpart C will not apply.  
This “non-prisoner” approach does not lessen the ethical concerns.  In 
some cases it may heighten them; the possibility to avoid prison by 
volunteering might be even more compelling than the chance to get out 
of prison early. 
Either alternative, however, raises an even more powerful political 
problem for the research sponsor, akin to (but much more severe than) 
the public relations and political problem discussed above with “true” 
volunteers.  In addition to looking at criminal behavior in prison, this 
research will examine the criminal behavior of research subjects outside 
prison, in the general society.  At least some of those subjects will only 
be free because of the research.  Victims of crimes they commit will 
likely be very unhappy when they learn they were robbed, raped, or 
assaulted by someone who was only at liberty because of the research.  
Research sponsors, and the government agencies that offered the 
favorable treatment that was needed to get research subjects, will have to 
expect terrible publicity, as well as possible tort litigation.  How many 
pharmaceutical, biotechnology, or medical devices firms, medical 
schools or universities, and prison or parole systems or prosecutors 
offices will be willing to take such risks? 
D. The Risk of Inappropriate Adoption of Crime Prevention Treatments 
For a host of reasons, good clinical trials of crime-reducing 
interventions will be hard to do—and therefore unlikely to be done.  That 
does not necessarily mean that interventions will not be tried.  The 
enthusiastic adoption of the prefrontal lobotomy is one frightening 
example.  In the emotionally (and politically) charged context of crime, 
the imposition of unproven technical “fixes” on the always unpopular 
class of “criminals” seems quite plausible.  And, in fact, we may already 
have an example of it—chemical castration.  Doubt remains about the 
effectiveness, focus, and implementation of American chemical 
castration statutes.  John Stinneford’s 2006 article reviewed these issues 
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in detail and, along with an earlier article by Michael Bailey and Aaron 
Greenberg, is the basis for the following discussion.93 
Support for the safety and efficacy of chemical castration comes 
mainly from European experience with surgical castration.  During the 
twentieth century, various European countries required or allowed 
surgical castration.94  The Nazi regime in Germany required surgical 
castration for some kinds of sex offenders; West Germany permitted 
some to choose it in return for lighter sentences.  Follow-up studies have 
been done with offenders surgically castrated in those two regimes as 
well as other European countries.  Bailey and Greenberg report that 
approximately twenty such studies were done, involving a total of more 
than 5,000 surgically castrated men.  Recidivism rates in all of the 
studies were quite low, ranging from zero to eleven percent.  These 
studies have a variety of methodological problems, most importantly the 
lack of a randomly assigned control group (studied offenders who were 
randomly assigned to not be castrated).  The studies also did not 
generally distinguish between types of sex offenses—some men were 
castrated for child molestation, others for raping adult women, others for 
exhibitionism, and some even for consensual homosexual behavior.  A 
study of the West German experience in the 1970s may have been the 
best; it compared men who chose to be castrated with men who initially 
agreed to castration but changed their minds.  Over an average eleven 
year follow-up period, the first group had a recidivism rate of three 
percent; the other group’s rate was forty-six percent.  (Of course, the fact 
that the men in the second group had changed their minds could certainly 
be a confounding factor in the analysis.) 
A major problem with this evidence, even apart from the 
methodological issues, is that it applies to surgical castration, not to 
chemical castration.  It is plausible that MPA treatments would have 
effects similar to surgical castration, because MPA also quickly reduces 
testosterone levels, but MPA was never approved by the FDA for use to 
reduce sex offender recidivism.95  Instead, it was approved as a birth 
control drug at a dose eight to forty times lower than the dose used in 
chemical castration.  The studies conducted on recidivism and chemical 
castration are few in number, with small sample sizes, and recidivism 
                                                          
 93. See Bailey & Greenberg, supra note 12; Stinneford, supra note 9. 
 94. One source notes studies of men surgically castrated in Denmark, Germany, Sweden, Nor-
way, Holland, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia.  Ariel Rösler & Eliezer Witztum, Pharmacotherapy 
of Paraphilias in the Next Millennium, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 43, 44 (2000). 
 95. One of the other drugs used in Europe, cyproterone acetate, has never been used for chemi-
cal castration in the United States because, unlike MPA, it has no FDA approved use.  Id. at 45. 
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rates varying from three percent to eighty-three percent.  It is thought to 
be effective with respect to only some kinds of sex offenses: pedophilia, 
exhibitionism, and voyeurism.  Unlike surgical castration, a one-time 
procedure, MPA treatment needs to continue permanently or the effects 
lapse.  MPA however, has serious side effects on many who take it, 
which has reduced compliance with the drug regime (in turn, perhaps, 
affecting recidivism) and even sparked malpractice litigation.96  When 
used (at much lower doses) in women for birth control, MPA has been 
linked to bone demineralization, which is in turn associated with 
osteoporosis, so strongly that a “black box” warning was added to the 
label in 2004 advising that the drug should not be used for more than two 
years unless the patient had no alternatives.  Whether it causes bone 
demineralization in men is unknown. 
The various American statutes do not necessarily target chemical 
castration where it has the greatest chance of being effective.  Most of 
them focus on sexual activity with children but the different statutes 
cover different kinds of offenses.  Some of the statutes also cover sexual 
offenses with adults, either in addition to earlier convictions for sexual 
misconduct with children or on their own.  None of the states requires 
that a physician, or any other professional, certify that the sex offender 
have a condition that would be affected by the procedure. 
Stinneford also notes that there may well be problems with 
implementing these statutes.  He reports that only Florida and Oregon 
had information on implementation of their chemical castration statutes.  
As of April 2005, less than ten percent of those required, by statute, in 
Florida to undergo chemical castration had received the treatment.  In 
Oregon more than a third of the forty-two offenders recommended for 
chemical castration had not received it.  One reason is that many doctors 
are reluctant to provide this treatment, out of fear of malpractice liability 
or because of ethical concerns—concerns that have led the American 
Medical Association to conclude that judicially-ordered chemical 
castration is unethical.97 
Eight American states have adopted chemical castration as a 
sentence or treatment for some sex offenders.  The drug used has never 
been approved for this purpose by the FDA, and indeed it has some 
                                                          
 96. Id. at 47. 
 97. See AM. MED. ASS’N., COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, COURT-INITIATED 
MEDICAL TREATMENTS IN CRIMINAL CASES, Rpt. 4-A-98, at 4 (1998) (stating that the “AMA op-
poses . . . castration . . . initiated solely for criminal punishment.”); see also AMA CODE OF MED. 
ETHICS, COURT-INITIATED MEDICAL TREATMENTS IN CRIMINAL CASES, E-2.065 (1998) (stating that 
“[p]hysicians can ethically participate in court-initiated medical treatments only if [it is] . . . not a 
form of punishment or solely a mechanism of social control.”). 
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serious side-effects.  In addition, the statutes do not try to fit the 
treatment to those whom it might positively affect, and at least some of 
the states that have adopted this treatment are having difficulty 
implementing it.98  It may turn out that this treatment is safe and effective 
for this purpose—or it may not.  We do not know. 
We do know that few citizens or legislators are very concerned about 
the rights and safety of sex offenders, many of whom have committed 
terrible crimes.  In light of that, it may be encouraging that only eight 
states have adopted chemical castration statutes.  On the other hand it is 
clearly evidence that legislators and judges will not always require proof 
of safety or efficacy before imposing unproven biological treatments on 
criminals as a way to prevent further crimes.  It is not an altogether 
encouraging sign for the careful control of neuroscience-based brain 
interventions to prevent crime. 
III. IF SAFE AND EFFECTIVE TREATMENTS EXISTED, HOW SHOULD THEY 
BE USED? 
What if we had safe and effective (however safety and efficacy are 
defined) neuroscience-based treatments for criminal behavior?  What 
should we think about in applying them?  I will not try, in this essay, to 
provide in-depth analysis of those questions, but, instead, will point to 
some areas of concern and a few thoughts on how to proceed. 
Specifically, I will not, in this essay, discuss the constitutional 
questions.  They will no doubt arise and be substantial.  Challenges could 
be raised to mandatory treatment under the due process clause of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, under the cruel and unusual 
punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment, perhaps under a “freedom 
of mind” application of the First Amendment, or a broader constitutional 
right of privacy.99  If the interventions are not “mandatory” but are 
chosen “voluntarily” in return for lenient treatment in the criminal justice 
system, we can expect to see other challenges, including attacks on  
 
                                                          
 98. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 99. The Ninth Circuit, in a case concerning the alleged aversive therapy to an inmate, held that 
the prisoner’s complaint should not have been dismissed because it alleged that the prisoner was 
subject to experimentation without his consent.  The court held “[p]roof of such matters could, in our 
judgment, raise serious constitutional questions respecting cruel and unusual punishment or imper-
missible tinkering with the mental processes.”  Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 
1973) (footnotes omitted).  For the “mental tinkering” argument, the court cited Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438, 452 (1972), and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1968), with a cf. cite to Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149–54 (1973). 
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whether the choice was truly voluntary or was, in effect, coerced in ways 
that might be unconstitutional. 
Constitutional issues have been discussed in the extensive law 
review literature about chemical castration.100  (Interestingly, they have 
been scarcely litigated and the four reported cases in the last twenty-four 
years come from jurisdictions without statutes authorizing castration.101)  
They deserve further discussion in the context of the other possible 
interventions, but not in this essay. 
Instead, I want to make several observations that speak more to 
ethics than to law. For the most part, these thoughts are preliminary and 
often speculative, some suggestions for further consideration rather than, 
at this point, conclusions. 
My first thought is the least preliminary.  We should not view the 
fact that these possible interventions would intervene directly in a 
subject’s brain as necessarily disqualifying them.  Many, but not all, of 
the justifications for criminal sanctions work by affecting a criminal’s 
brain.  Any kind of rehabilitation acts only through changing the 
criminal’s behavior, which works through changing the criminal’s brain.  
Specific deterrence operates, if at all, through changing the outcome of 
the operations of the deterred person’s brain.  And the subjective 
sensation or realization of being punished exists only within the brain of 
the punished person.  Of course, incapacitation, general deterrence, and 
society’s satisfaction with punishment, exist outside the criminal’s brain  
(though the second and third exist through the operations of the brains of 
others). 
                                                          
 100. See supra note 12. 
 101. I can find only four reported cases in the modern era dealing with constitutional challenges 
to chemical or surgical castration.  The first two cases were decided in the mid-1980s, more than a 
decade before the first chemical castration statute.  In People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310, 317, 
modified, 353 N.W.2d 463 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984), a Michigan appellate court held that chemical 
castration was an unlawful condition of probation, in part because it was unauthorized by statute and 
in part because it had not been medically accepted.  In State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410 (S.C. 1985), 
the South Carolina Supreme Court summarily reversed plea bargains in which three defendants had 
voluntarily consented to surgical castration even though the defendants waived appeal.  That court  
found that the sentences were void as violating public policies against cruel and unusual punishment 
and mutilation.  Id. at 412. 
The other two cases were decided in 1999 and 2000.  In the first, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
ruled that the American Civil Liberties Union did not have standing to bring suit on behalf of a 
criminal defendant who consented to surgical castration as part of a plea bargain.  ACLU v. State, 5 
S.W.3d 418, 419–20 (Ark. 1999).  Interestingly, like South Carolina, Arkansas had (and still has) no 
statute authorizing either form of castration.  In the second, a judge on the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court set aside a juvenile court disposition requiring that a mentally ill juvenile be evaluated for pos-
sible chemical castration, finding that, in the absence of both legislative authorization and clear 
medical acceptance, the order exceeded the power of the juvenile court.  In re R.B., 765 A.2d 396, 
397–99 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). 
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Those effects are the result of physical, biological changes in the 
criminal’s brain.  All thoughts and controlled actions appear to be the 
result of the firings of neurons in the brain.  Anything that changes 
behavior by changing controlled actions will work, ultimately, by 
changing what neurons fire when and how.  (And, of course, if you 
remember anything from this essay, it will be because reading it has 
made changes in your brain.)  This is not an argument about “free will,” 
but merely an argument that many of the actions the criminal justice 
system takes act through physical changes in criminal’s brains. 
Given that, I see no qualitative difference between acting directly to 
change a criminal’s brain—through drugs, surgery, DBS, or vaccines, if 
proven safe and effective—and acting indirectly—through punishment, 
rehabilitation, cognitive therapy, parole conditions—to achieve similar 
ends.  It is true that we understand better the likely effects of the 
traditional methods of trying to change criminals’ behavior, including 
their strong likelihood of failure.  Ignorance of a direct intervention’s 
safety and efficacy would certainly be an important strike against its use, 
but if the intervention is proven safe and effective (again, to whatever 
standards one applies), direct and indirect interventions seem to me not 
importantly different. 
Thus far, I have just argued that direct brain interventions should not 
be dismissed out of hand.  But under what conditions could they be 
ethically used?  At this point, it seems to me that we can distinguish 
usefully between some easier, less easy, and downright hard cases. 
To fall into the “easy” category, I suggest that an intervention has to 
meet at least three criteria.  First, it must be proven sufficiently effective 
at preventing future criminal behavior with an acceptable level of risk or 
harm.  Second, it must be accepted voluntarily by an informed, 
competent adult.  And third, it must not cause major changes in the 
“treated” person’s personality, substantial loss of remembered personal 
history, or significant harm to his cognitive abilities.  The first point has 
been examined; the second and third require more discussion. 
An easy case involves a voluntary decision by a competent, informed 
adult because we normally concede that competent, informed adults have 
the right to make decisions about themselves.  We do not allow 
competent, informed adults to do anything they want as long as it does 
not harm others, but we expect there to be some good reason to 
intervene. 
Major changes to the criminal’s personality or serious harm to his 
cognitive abilities may be such good reasons.  At least two different 
rationales seem appropriate.  First, one could view a state-sponsored 
intervention that intentionally made major changes in a criminal’s 
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personality as equivalent to the death penalty.  A person is not, in 
essence, a body but a personality bound together by the thread of a 
remembered history.  Killing the personality, or killing the memory, kills 
the person.  (A substantial decline in cognitive capacity may not reach 
quite that level, but if the decline were sufficiently severe, it might 
qualify.)  A biological organism of the species Homo sapiens continues 
to exist, but it is not the person who began the treatment.  Most, if not all, 
arguments one finds convincing against capital punishment should apply 
to these kinds of interventions.  Even those who do not oppose capital 
punishment might oppose these kinds of interventions as violating some 
important aspects of human dignity, even if accepted voluntarily by the 
criminal.  Consider, for example, a voluntarily accepted punishment that 
put the criminal in a condition similar to advanced dementia.  That seems 
arguably either (or both) the destruction of that person or the intentional 
and unacceptable degradation of a human.102  It is this intuition, I think, 
that makes the prefrontal lobotomy, at least as its consequences are 
generally perceived, so unacceptable. 
If those are easy cases, a set of somewhat harder cases play around 
with the criteria of “voluntary decision” and “competent, informed 
adult.”  Voluntariness is particularly pertinent in the criminal context.  
Should an action count as “voluntary” if it is done in preference to 
criminal punishment, particularly incarceration?  The line between hard 
choices and impermissible coercion is rarely, if ever, easily drawn, in 
ethics or in law, but a legal analogy may be useful in this context. 
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS describes the defense 
of “duress” as when “a party’s manifestation of assent is induced by an 
improper threat by the other party that leaves the victim with no 
reasonable alternative.”103  Threats are improper if they are crimes or 
torts, are threats of criminal prosecution or bad faith civil action, or a 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or if the terms are 
unfair and the threatened action would harm one side without benefiting 
the other, stems from a prior unfair course of dealing, or “is otherwise a 
use of power for illegitimate ends.”104 
In the context of criminal sentencing, the convict may be given a 
choice between a sentence or a course of “treatment.”  The sentence is, 
                                                          
 102. One needs to be careful with this analogy, though.  One might argue that a person in the 
final stages of natural dementia is less than fully human.  That argument has a certain plausibility, 
but is not a position to be taken lightly (and not a position I am either taking or rejecting in this es-
say). 
 103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §175 (1) (1981). 
 104. Id. §176. 
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we will presume, legitimate, imposed with due process of law and 
intended, one way or another, to protect or benefit society.  In that case, 
the convict’s choice is not entirely “free.”  It is certainly influenced by 
the knowledge that if he turns down the treatment, he faces, let’s say, ten 
years in prison.  Yet that prison term is legitimate, even presumptively 
just.  And the treatment—assuming again that it has been proven safe 
and effective—is aimed at helping society (and arguably the criminal).  
We often make hard decisions, faced with real constraints.  If the 
constraints created by the criminal justice system are legitimate, it seems 
hard to argue that a competent adult may not be allowed to make a 
choice between them. 
On the other hand, it is at least interesting that the nation’s only 
solely surgical castration statute takes a very rigid view of voluntariness.  
The Texas statute authorizing surgical castration applies only to persons 
with at least two convictions for specified sexual offenses.105  The 
criminal must be at least twenty-one years old; must be counseled and 
evaluated by both a psychiatrist and a psychologist; and must, in writing, 
admit to the last crime, request the procedure, and give informed 
consent.106  He then must meet with an independent monitor whose 
duties are to ensure that the criminal received appropriate information 
about the procedure and that he was not coerced.107  Most significantly, 
the Texas statute forbids castration as a condition of release for parole 
with mandatory supervision and nowhere authorizes a quid pro quo of 
any kind to someone who agrees to a surgical castration.108 
Still harder questions involve decisions to “treat” people who are not 
competent adults.  Children and incompetents lack the capacity legally, 
and usually ethically, to give full consent.  If the intervention is 
sufficiently useful, should it be applied to them anyway?  And if so, 
under what conditions, and by whom—their parents?  A court?  One is 
tempted to approve some kind of “best interests” test, but one does have 
to worry how well such a test will be (or can be) applied.  In the case of a 
juvenile who is expected to become competent, it may be an easy 
solution to wait for time to give them the power to decide—unless, of 
course, for some reason the treatment needs to be started during their  
minority.  For someone incompetent due to mental illness or disability, 
that option is not available. 
 
                                                          
 105. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.061(a)(1) (2007). 
 106. Id. § 501.061(a). 
 107. Id. § 501.601(a), (f). 
 108. Id. § 508.226.  See the discussion in Stinneford, supra note 9, at 581–82. 
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The hardest cases, I think, arise with mandatory, involuntary 
treatments and with treatments with severe consequences.  To say those 
cases are the hardest is not to say whether they are or are not permissible.  
A sentence of life imprisonment is a mandatory, involuntary intervention 
and one with substantial consequences for the prisoner’s brain (and 
body).  But it seems safe to say that confidence in the safety and efficacy 
of the treatment should be even stronger when it is used involuntarily 
than when it is used voluntarily. 
In general, it seems to me easier to reject severe interventions, those 
that wipe out the criminal’s personality or memories or that greatly 
reduce his cognitive abilities.  And yet what if an informed competent 
adult who has been found guilty of heinous crimes asks for such a 
treatment, one that leaves his body alive but with a substantially new 
mind, one that can make a new start?  Is that a request that cannot 
ethically be granted? 
It is time to return from speculation.  In reality, if any neuroscience-
based treatments are approved as safe and effective to treat criminal 
behavior, they will be specific interventions for specific behaviors, with 
known risks.  The hardest questions may never arise; indeed, given the 
grave difficulties of proving safety and efficacy of such interventions, no 
questions may arise.  On the other hand, we may already have an 
example: pharmacological treatments for addiction.  Methadone, 
naltrexone, disulfiram, and acamprosate are all drugs used to treat 
addictions—addiction to opioids for the first two, which almost always 
results in illegal behavior (if only the illegal use of the opioids), and 
addiction to alcohol for the last three (naltrexone is used for both).  Their 
voluntary use by competent, informed adults in order to avoid harsher 
criminal sanctions seems relatively uncontroversial.  It may be that, if 
and when the other methods become real, the appropriate limits of their 
use may also be, if not clear, at least not terribly difficult. 
CONCLUSION 
Our knowledge of the human brain is expanding exponentially.  Our 
concern about crime is high and does not seem to be diminishing.  These 
two realities are going to collide in various ways.  I suggest that one 
significant result of that collision will be efforts to apply neuroscience to 
“treat” criminal behavior.  They have already, in some respects, begun.  
We need to begin to think about how to deal with such efforts.  
Specifically, we need to demand that any such treatments have been 
proven safe and effective, which may require some changes in what 
kinds of clinical trials we will accept.  More broadly we need to begin to 
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think about when and how such interventions could be used.  We cannot 
expect, and should not try, to come to conclusions too far in advance of 
the facts, but we can begin to prepare.  If we do not, we may find that 
neuroscience and the criminal justice system have combined to produce 
the next great prefrontal lobotomy, which, with or without a Nobel Prize, 
would truly be a bad thing. 
 
